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Abstract— Message validation is one of the most effective ways to thwart unauthorized and corrupted 
messages from being forwarded in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). For this reason, many message 
validation schemes have been developed, based on either symmetric-key cryptosystems or public-key 
cryptosystems.
  
Most of them, however, have the limitations of high computational and communication overhead in 
addition to lack of scalability and resilience to node compromise attacks.  
To address these issues, a polynomial-based scheme was recently introduced. However, this scheme and 
its extensions all have the weakness of a built-in threshold determined by the degree of the polynomial: 
when the number of messages transmitted is larger than this threshold, the adversary can fully recover 
the polynomial. 
Index Terms—Hop-by-hop validation, symmetric-key cryptosystem, public-key cryptosystem, source 
privacy, simulation, wireless sensor networks (WSNs), distributed algorithm, decentralized control
I. INTRODUCTION 
Message validation plays a key role in thwarting 
unauthorized and corrupted messages from being 
forwarded in networks to save the precious sensor 
energy. For this reason, many validation schemes have 
been proposed in literature to provide message 
authenticity and integrity verification for wireless sensor 
networks (WSNs). These schemes can largely be 
divided into two categories: public-key based 
approaches and symmetric-key based approaches. 
The symmetric-key based approach requires complex 
key management, lacks of scalability, and is not resilient 
to large numbers of node compromise attacks since the 
message sender and the receiver have to share a secret 
key. The shared key is used by the sender to generate a 
message validation code (MAC) for each transmitted 
message. However, for this method, the authenticity and 
integrity of the message can only be verified by the node 
with the shared secret key, which is generally shared by 
a group of sensor nodes. An intruder can compromise 
the key by capturing a single sensor node. In addition, 
this method does not work in multicast networks. 
To solve the scalability problem, a secret polynomial 
based message validation scheme was introduced in. 
The idea of this scheme is similar to a threshold secret 
sharing, where the threshold is determined by the degree 
of the polynomial. This approach offers information-
theoretic security of the shared secret key when the 
number of messages transmitted is less than the 
threshold. The intermediate nodes verify the authenticity 
of the message through a polynomial evaluation. 
However, when the number of messages transmitted is 
larger than the threshold, the polynomial can be fully 
recovered and the system is completely broken. 
An alternative solution was proposed in to thwart the 
intruder from recovering the polynomial by computing 
the coefficients of the polynomial. The idea is to add a 
random noise, also called a perturbation factor, to the 
polynomial so that the coefficients of the polynomial 
cannot be easily solved. However, a recent study shows 
that the random noise can be completely removed from 
the polynomial using error-correcting code techniques. 
For the public-key based approach, each message is 
transmit-ted along with the digital signature of the 
message generated using the sender’s private key. Every 
intermediate forwarder and the final receiver can 
authenticate the message using the sender’s public key. 
One of the limitations of the public-key based scheme is 
the high computational overhead. The recent progress on 
elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) shows that the public-
key schemes can be more advantageous in terms of 
computational complexity, memory usage, and security 
resilience, since public-key based approaches have a 
simple and clean key management. 
In this paper, we propose an unconditionally secure and 
efficient source anonymous message validation (SAMA) 
scheme based on the optimal modified ElGamal 
signature (MES) scheme on elliptic curves. This MES 
scheme is secure against adaptive chosen-message 
attacks in the random oracle model. Our scheme enables 
the intermediate nodes to authenticate the message so 
that all corrupted message can be detected and dropped 
to conserve the sensor power. While achieving 
compromise-resiliency, flexible-time validation and 
source identity protection, our scheme does not have the 
threshold problem.  
Both theoretical analysis and simulation results 
demonstrate that our proposed scheme is more efficient 
than the polynomial-based algorithms under comparable 
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security levels. 
The major contributions of this paper are the following: 
1) We develop a source anonymous message 
validation code (SAMAC) on elliptic curves that 
can provide un-conditional source anonymity.  
2) We offer an efficient hop-by-hop message 
validation mechanism for WSNs without the 
threshold limitation.  
3) We devise network implementation criteria on 
source node privacy protection in WSNs.  
4) We propose an efficient key management 
framework to ensure isolation of the compromised 
nodes.  
5) We provide extensive simulation results under ns-
2 and TelosB on multiple security levels.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first scheme 
that provides hop-by-hop node validation without the 
threshold limitation, and has performance better than the 
symmetric-key based schemes. The distributed nature of 
our algorithm makes the scheme suitable for 
decentralized networks. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II 
presents the terminology and the preliminary that will be 
used in this paper. Section III discusses the related work, 
with a focus on polynomial-based schemes. Section IV 
describes the proposed source anonymous message 
validation scheme on elliptic curves. Section V 
discusses the ambiguity set (AS) selection strategies for 
source privacy. Section VI describes key management 
and compromised node detection. Performance analysis 
and simulation results are provided in Section VII. We 
conclude in Section VIII. 
II. TERMINOLOGY AND PRELIMINARY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1: Sensor node Deployment 
In this section, we will briefly describe the terminology 
and the cryptographic tools that will be used in this 
paper.  
A.  Threat Model and Assumptions 
The wireless sensor networks are assumed to consist of a 
large number of sensor nodes. We assume that each 
sensor node knows its relative location in the sensor 
domain and is capable of communicating with its 
neighboring nodes directly using geographic routing. 
The whole network is fully connected through multi-hop 
communications. We assume there is a security server 
(SS) that is responsible for generation, storage and 
distribution of the security parameters among the 
network. This server will never be compromised. 
However, after deployment, the sensor nodes may be 
captured and compromised by attackers. Once 
compromised, all information stored in the sensor nodes 
can be accessed by the attackers. The compromised 
nodes can be reprogrammed and fully controlled by the 
attackers. However, the compromised nodes will not be 
able to create new public keys that can be accepted by 
the SS and other nodes. 
Based on the above assumptions, this paper considers 
two types of attacks launched by the adversaries: 
• Passive attacks: Through passive attacks, the 
adversaries could eavesdrop on messages 
transmitted in the network and perform traffic 
analysis.  
• Active attacks: Active attacks can only be 
launched from the compromised sensor nodes. 
Once the sensor nodes are compromised, the 
adversaries will obtain all the in-formation stored 
in the compromised nodes, including the security 
parameters of the compromised nodes. The 
adversaries can modify the contents of the 
messages, and inject their own messages.  
B. Design Goals  
Our proposed validation scheme aims at achieving the 
following goals: 
• Message validation: The message receiver should 
be able to verify whether a received message is 
sent by the node that is claimed, or by a node in a 
particular group. In other words, the adversaries 
cannot pretend to be an innocent node and inject 
fake messages into the network without being 
detected.  
• Message integrity: The message receiver should be 
able to verify whether the message has been 
modified en-route by the adversaries. In other 
words, the adversaries cannot modify the message 
content without being detected.  
• Hop-by-hop message validation: Every forwarder 
on the routing path should be able to verify the 
authenticity and integrity of the messages upon 
reception.  
• Identity and location privacy: The adversaries 
cannot determine the message sender’s ID and 
location by analyzing the message contents or the 
local traffic.  
• Node compromise resilience: The scheme should 
be resilient to node compromise attacks. No matter 
how many nodes are compromised, the remaining 
nodes can still be secure.  
• Efficiency: The scheme should be efficient in 
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terms of both computational and communication 
overhead.  
C. Terminology  
Privacy is sometimes referred to as anonymity. 
Communication anonymity in information management 
has been discussed in a number of previous works.  It 
generally refers to the state of being unidentifiable 
within a set of subjects. This set is called the ambiguity 
set (AS). Sender anonymity means that a particular 
message is not linkable to any sender, and no message is 
linkable to a particular sender. 
We will start with the definition of the unconditionally 
secure source anonymous message validation scheme 
(SAMA). 
Definition 1 (SAMA). A SAMA consists of the 
following two algorithms: 
 
• Generate (m, Q1, Q2, · · · , Qn):  Given a message and 
the public keys Q1, Q2, · · · , Qn of the AS 
S={A1,A2,…An}, the actual message sender at ,1≤ t 
≤ (n,  produces an anonymous message S(m) using 
its own private key dt. 
• Verify S(m): Given a message m and an anonymous 
message S(m), which includes the public keys of all 
members in the AS, a verifier can determine 
whether S(m) is generated by a member in the AS.  
The security requirements for SAMA include: 
• Sender ambiguity: The probability that a verifier 
success-fully determines the real sender of the 
anonymous message is exactly 1/n, where n is the total 
number of members in the AS. 
• Unforgeability:  An  anonymous  message  scheme  
is  un- forgeable  if no adversary, given the public 
keys of all members of the AS and the anonymous 
messages m1, m2, · · · , mn adaptively chosen by the 
adversary, can produce in polynomial time a new 
valid anonymous message with non-negligible 
probability. 
In this paper, the user ID and the user public key will be 
used interchangeably without making any distinctions. 
D.  Modified ElGamal Signature Scheme (MES) 
Definition 2 (MES). The modified ElGamal signature 
scheme consists of the following three algorithms: 
Key generation algorithm: Let p be a large prime and g 
be a generator of Z∗p. Both p and g are made public. 
For a random private key x ∈ Zp, the public key y is 
computed from y = gx mod p. 
Signature algorithm: The MES can also have many 
variants [18], [19]. For the purpose of efficiency, we 
will describe the variant, called optimal scheme. To sign 
a message m, one chooses a random k ∈ Z∗p−1, then 
computes the exponentiation r = gk mod p and solves s 
from: 
s = rxh(m, r) + k mod (p − 1), (1)
where h is a one-way hash function. The signature of 
message m is defined as the pair (r, s). 
Verification algorithm: The verifier checks whether the 
signature equation gs = ryrh(m,r) mod p. If the equality 
holds true, then the verifier Accepts the signature, and 
Rejects otherwise. 
III. RELATED WORK 
Symmetric key and hash based validation schemes were 
proposed for WSNs. In these schemes, each symmetric 
validation key is shared by a group of sensor nodes. An 
intruder can compromise the key by capturing a single 
sensor node. Therefore, these schemes are not resilient 
to node compromise attacks. Another type of 
symmetric-key scheme requires synchronization among 
nodes. These schemes, including TESLA [5] and its 
variants, can also provide message sender validation. 
However, this scheme requires initial time 
synchronization, which is not easy to be implemented in 
large scale WSNs. In addition, they also introduce delay 
in message validation, and the delay increases as the 
network scales up. 
A secret polynomial based message validation scheme 
was introduced in. This scheme offers information-
theoretic security with ideas similar to a threshold secret 
sharing, where the threshold is determined by the degree 
of the polynomial. When the number of messages 
transmitted is below the thresh-old, the scheme enables 
the intermediate node to verify the authenticity of the 
message through polynomial evaluation. However, when 
the number of messages transmitted is larger than the 
threshold, the polynomial can be fully recovered and the 
system is completely broken. To increase the threshold 
and the complexity for the intruder to reconstruct the 
secret polynomial, a random noise, also called a 
perturbation factor, was added to the polynomial in [4] 
to thwart the adversary from computing the coefficient 
of the polynomial. However, the added perturbation 
factor can be completely removed using error-correcting 
code techniques 
For the public-key based approach, each message is 
transmit-ted along with the digital signature of the 
message generated using the sender’s private key. Every 
intermediate forwarder and the final receiver can 
authenticate the message using the sender’s public key. 
The recent progress on elliptic curve cryptography 
(ECC) shows that the public-key schemes can be more 
advantageous in terms of memory usage, message 
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complexity, and security resilience, since public-key 
based approaches have a simple and clean key 
management 
The existing anonymous communication protocols are 
largely stemmed from either mixnet or DC-net. a sender 
encrypts an outgoing message, and the ID of the 
recipient, using the public key of the mix. The mix 
accumulates a batch of encrypted messages, decrypts 
and reorders these messages, and forwards them to the 
recipients. Since mixnet-like protocols rely on the 
statistical properties of the background traffic, they 
cannot provide provable anonymity. DC-net [12], [16] is 
an anonymous multi-party computation scheme. Some 
pairs of the participants are required to share secret keys. 
DC-net provides perfect (information-theoretic) sender 
anonymity without requiring trusted servers. However, 
in DC-net, only one user can send at a time, so it takes 
additional bandwidth to handle collision and contention. 
Recently, message sender anonymity based on ring 
signatures was introduced [20]. This approach enables 
the message sender to generate a source anonymous 
message signature with content authenticity assurance. 
To generate a ring signature, a ring member randomly 
selects an AS and forges a message signature for all 
other members. Then he uses his trap-door information 
to glue the ring together. The original scheme has very 
limited flexibility and very high complexity. Moreover, 
the original paper only focuses on the cryptographic 
algorithm, and the relevant network issues were left 
unaddressed. 
IV. PROPOSED SOURCE ANONYMOUS 
MESSAGE VALIDATION (SAMA) ON 
ELLIPTIC CURVES 
In this section, we propose an unconditionally secure 
and efficient source anonymous message validation 
scheme (SAMA). The main idea is that for each 
message m to be released, the message sender, or the 
sending node, generates a source anonymous message 
authenticator for the message m. The generation is based 
on the MES scheme on elliptic curves. For a ring 
signature, each ring member is required to compute a 
forgery signature for all other members in the AS. In our 
scheme, the entire SAMA generation requires only three 
steps, which link all non-senders and the message sender 
to the SAMA alike. In addition, our design enables the 
SAMA to be verified through a single equation without 
individually verifying the signatures. 
A.  Proposed MES Scheme on Elliptic Curves 
Let p > 3 be an odd prime. An elliptic curve E is defined 
by an equation of the form: 
E :  y2 = x3 + ax + b mod p, 
where a, b ∗ Fp, and 4a3 + 27b2 _≡ 0 mod p. The set 
E(Fp) consists of all points (x, y) ∗ Fp on the curve, 
together with a special point O, called the point at 
infinity. 
Let G = (xG, yG) be a base point on E(Fp) whose order is 
a very large value N . User A selects a random integer dA 
∗ [1, N − 1] as his private key. Then, he can compute 
his public key QA from QA = dA × G. 
 Signature  generation  algorithm:  For Alice to sign a 
message m, she follows these steps: 
1) Select a random integer kA, 1 ≤ kA ≤ N − 1. 
2) Calculate r = xA mod N , where (xA, yA) = kAG. If 
 r = 0, go back to step 1. 
 l 
3) Calculate hA  ←− h(m, r), where h isl a cryptographic 
 hash function, such as SHA-1, and ←− denotes the l 
leftmost bits of the hash. 
 
4) Calculate s = rdAhA + kA mod N . If s = 0, go back 
to step 2.  
 
5) The signature is the pair (r, s).  
Signature verification algorithm: For Bob to 
authenticate Alice’s signature, he must have a copy of 
her public key QA, then he: 
1) Checks that QA _= O, otherwise invalid  
2) Checks that QA lies on the curve  
3) Checks that nQA = O  
After that, Bob follows these steps to verify the 
signature: 1) Verify that r and s are integers in [1, N − 
1]. If not, the signature is invalid. 
l 
2) Calculate hA ←− h(m, r), where h is the same 
function used in the signature generation. 
3)  Calculate (x1, x2) = sG − rhAQA mod N . 
4) The signature is valid if r = x1 mod N , invalid 
other-wise. 
In fact, if the signature is correctly generated, then: 
(x1, x2)  =  sG − rhAQA 
= (rdAhA + kA)G − rhAQA  
= kAG + rhAQA − rhAQA  
Therefore, we have x1 = r, and the verifier should 
Accept the signature. 
B.  Proposed SAMA on Elliptic Curves 
Suppose that the message sender (say Alice) wishes to 
transmit a message m anonymously from her network 
node to any other nodes. The AS includes n members, 
A1, A2, · · · , An, e.g., S = {A1, A2, · · · , An}, where the 
actual message sender Alice is At, for some value t, 1 ≤ t 
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≤ n. In this paper, we will not distinguish between the 
node Ai and its public key Qi. Therefore, we also have S 
= {Q1, Q2, · · · , Qn}. 
Validation generation algorithm: Suppose m is a 
message to be transmitted. The private key of the 
message sender Alice is dt, 1 ≤ t ≤ N . To generate an 
efficient SAMA for message m, Alice performs the 
following three steps: 
1) Select a random and pairwise different ki for each 
1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, i _= t and compute ri from (ri, yi) = 
kiG.  
2) Choose a random ki ∗ Zp and compute rt from (rt, 
yt) =  
ktG −   rihiQi such that rt _= 0 and rt _= ri for any 
i_=t 
l 
i =_ t, where hi ←− h(m, ri). 
3)  Compute s = kt +   ki + rtdtht mod N . 
i_=t 
The SAMA of the message m is defined as: 
S(m) = (m, S, r1, y1, · · · , rn, yn, s). 
C.  Verification of SAMA 
Verification algorithm: For Bob to verify an alleged 
SAMA (m, S, r1, y1, · · · , rn, yn, s), he must have a copy 
of the public keys Q1, · · · , Qn. Then he: 
1) Checks that Qi _= O, i = 1, · · · , n, otherwise 
invalid  
2) Checks that Qi, i = 1, · · · , n lies on the curve  
3) Checks that nQi = O, i = 1, · · · , n  
After that, Bob follows these steps: 
1) Verify that ri, yi, i = 1, · · · , n and s are integers in  
 [1, N 1]. If not, the signature is invalid.  
 − l  
2) Calculate hi ←− h(m, ri), where h is the same function  
 used in the signature generation.  
   n  
3) Calculate (x0, y0) = sG − i=1 rihiQi  
4) The signature is valid if the first coordinate of   (ri, yi)  
i 
equals x0, invalid otherwise. 
In fact, if the SAMA has been correctly generated 
without being modified, then we compute: 
D.  Security Analysis 
In this subsection, we will prove that the proposed 
SAMA scheme can provide unconditional source 
anonymity and provable unforgeability against adaptive 
chosen-message attacks. 
1) Anonymity: In order to prove that the proposed 
SAMA can ensure unconditional source anonymity, we 
have to prove that: (i) for anybody other than the 
members of S, the probability to successfully identify 
the real sender is 1/n, and (ii) anybody from S can 
generate SAMAs. 
Theorem 1. The proposed source anonymous message 
validation scheme (SAMA) can provide unconditional 
message sender anonymity. 
Proof: The identity of the message sender is 
unconditionally protected with the proposed SAMA 
scheme. This is because, regardless of the sender’s 
identity, there are exactly (N − 1)(N − 2) · · · (N − n) 
different options to generate the SAMA. All of them can 
be chosen by any members in the AS during the SAMA 
generation procedure with equal probability without 
depending on any complexity-theoretic assumptions. 
The proof for the second part, that anybody from S can 
generate the SAMA, is straightforward. This finishes the 
proof of this theorem.  
2) Unforgeability: The design of the proposed SAMA 
relies on the ElGamal signature scheme. Signature 
schemes can achieve different levels of security. 
Security against existential forgery under adaptive-
chosen message attacks is the maximum level of 
security. 
In this section, we will prove that the proposed SAMA 
is secure against existential forgery under adaptive-
chosen message attacks in the random oracle model 
The security of our result is based on elliptic curve 
cryptography (ECC), which assumes that the 
computation of discrete logarithms on elliptic curves is 
computationally infeasible. In other words, no efficient 
algorithms are known for non-quantum computers. 
We will introduce two lemmas. Lemma 1 is the Splitting 
Lemma, which is a well-known probabilistic lemma 
from reference [10]. The basic idea of the Splitting 
Lemma is that when a subset Z is “large” in a product 
space X × Y , it will have many “large” sections. Lemma 
2 is a slight modification of the Forking Lemma 
presented in [10]. The proofs of the two lemmas are 
mainly probability theory related. We will skip the 
proofs of these two lemmas here. 
Lemma 1 (The Splitting Lemma).   
Lemma 2 (The Forking Lemma). Let A be a 
Probabilistic Polynomial Time (PPT) Turing machine. 
Given only the public data as input, if A can find, with 
non-negligible probability, a valid SAMA (m, S, r1, y1, · · 
· , rn, yn, h1, · · · , hn, s) within a bounded polynomial time 
T , then with non-negligible probability, a replay of this 
machine, which has control over A and a different 
oracle, outputs another valid SAMA (m, S, r1, y1, · · · , rn, 
yn, h_1, · · · , h_n, s), such that hi = h_i, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ v, i 
_= j for some fixed j. 
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Theorem 2. The proposed SAMA is secure against 
adaptive chosen-message attacks in the random oracle 
model. 
Therefore, we can compute the elliptic curve discrete 
logarithm of Qj in base G with non-negligible 
probability, which contradicts the assumption that it is 
computationally infeasible to compute the elliptic 
discrete logarithm of Qj in base G. Therefore, it is 
computationally infeasible for any adversary to forge a 
valid SAMA.  
V. AS SELECTION AND SOURCE PRIVACY 
The appropriate selection of an AS plays a key role in 
message source privacy, since the actual message source 
node will be hidden in the AS. In this section, we will 
discuss techniques that can prevent the adversaries from 
tracking the 
 Nodes in the AS   Nodes not in the AS Active 
routing path
 
Anonymous set selection in active routing message 
source through the AS analysis in combination with 
local traffic analysis. 
Before a message is transmitted, the message source 
node selects an AS from the public key list in the SS as 
its choice. This set should include itself, together with 
some other nodes. When an adversary receives a 
message, he can possibly find the direction of the 
previous hop, or even the real node of the previous hop. 
However, the adversary is unable to distinguish whether 
the previous node is the actual source node or simply a 
forwarder node if the adversary is unable to monitor the 
traffic of the previous hop. Therefore, the selection of 
the AS should create sufficient diversity so that it is 
infeasible for the adversary to find the message source 
based on the selection of the AS itself. 
Some basic criteria for the selection of the AS can be 
described as follows: 
• To provide message source privacy, the message 
source needs to select the AS to include nodes from 
all directions of the source node. In particular, the 
AS should include nodes from the opposite direction 
of the successor node. In this way, even the 
immediate successor node will not be able to 
distinguish the message source node from the 
forwarder based on the message that it receives.  
• Though the message source node can select any node 
in the AS, some nodes in the AS may not be able to 
add any ambiguity to the message source node. For 
instance, the nodes that are apparently impossible or 
very unlikely to be included in the AS based on the 
geographic routing. Therefore, these nodes are not 
appropriate candidates for the AS. They should be 
excluded from the AS for energy efficiency.  
• To balance the source privacy and efficiency, we 
should try to select the nodes to be within a 
predefined distance range from the routing path. We 
recommend selecting an AS from the nodes in a band 
that covers the active routing path. However, the AS 
does not have to include all the nodes in the routing 
path.  
• The AS does not have to include all nodes in that 
range, nor does it have to include all the nodes in the 
active routing path. In fact, if all nodes are included 
in the AS, then this may help the adversary to 
identity the possible routing path and find the source 
node.  
As an example, suppose we want to transmit a packet 
from source node S to destination node D in . We select 
the AS to include only nodes marked with ◦, while nodes 
marked as • will not be included in the AS. Of all these ◦ 
nodes, some of them are on the active routing path, 
while others are not. However, all these nodes are 
located within the shaded band area surrounding the 
active routing path. Suppose node A is compromised, 
unless node A collaborates with other nodes and can 
fully monitor the traffic of the source node S, it will not 
be able to determine whether S is the source node, or 
simply a forwarder. Similar analysis is also true for 
other nodes. 
Any node in the active routing path can verify the 
contents’ authenticity and integrity. However, anybody 
who receives a packet in the transmission can possibly 
exclude some of the nodes in the WSNs as the possible 
source node. Inclusion of these nodes in the AS will not 
increase the source privacy. Nevertheless, the more the 
nodes included in the AS are, the higher the energy cost 
will be. Therefore, the selection of the AS has to be done 
with care so that the energy cost and the source privacy 
can both be optimized. 
In addition, to balance the power consumption between 
authenticity and integrity verification, and the possibility 
that corrupted messages are being forwarded, the 
verification ser-vice may not have to take place in every 
hop; instead, it may be configured to take place in every 
other hop, for instance. 
VI. KEY MANAGEMENT AND 
COMPROMISED NODE DETECTION 
In our scheme, we assume that there is an SS whose 
responsibilities include public-key storage and 
distribution in the WSNs. We assume that the SS will 
never be compromised. However, after deployment, the 
sensor node may be captured and compromised by the 
attackers. Once compromised, all information stored in 
the sensor node will be accessible to the attackers. We 
further assume that the compromised node will not be 
able to create new public keys that can be accepted by 
the SS. 
For efficiency, each public key will have a short 
identity. The length of the identity is based on the scale 
of the WSNs. 
A.  Compromised Node Detection 
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As a special scenario, we assume that all sensor 
information will be delivered to a sink node, which can 
be co-located with the SS. As described in Section V, 
when a message is received by the sink node, the 
message source is hidden in an AS. Since the SAMA 
scheme guarantees that the message integrity is 
untampered, when a bad or meaningless message is 
received by the sink node, the source node is viewed as 
compromised. If the compromised source node only 
transmits one message, it would be very difficult for the 
node to be identified without additional network traffic 
information. However, when a compromised node 
transmits more than one message, the sink node can 
narrow the possible compromised nodes down to a very 
small set. 
 
Fig 2: Sensor Register 
As shown in Fig. 2, we use the circle to represent an AS. 
When only one message is transmitted, the sink node 
can only obtain the information that the source node will 
be in a set, say AS1. When the compromised source node 
transmits two messages, the sink node will be able to 
narrow the source authenticated and dropped by the 
receiving node. This not only consumes extra sensor 
power, but also increases the network collision and 
decreases the message delivery ratio. In addition to 
performance improvement, enabling intermediate node 
validation will thwart adversaries from performing 
denial-of-service attacks through message manipulation 
to deplete the energy and communication resources of 
the wireless network. Therefore, developing a protocol 
that can provide hop-by-hop intermediate node 
validation is an important research task. 
Most of the validation schemes are based on symmetric-
key schemes, including the polynomial evaluation based 
thresh-old validation scheme [4]. The secret bivariate 
polynomial is defined as [3]: 
dx  dy 
f (x, y) = Ai,j xiyj , 
 
i=0 j=0 
where each coefficient Ax,y is an element of a finite field 
Fp, and dx and dy are the degrees of this polynomial. dx 
and dy are also related to the message length and the 
computational complexity of this scheme. From the 
performance aspect, dx and dy should be as short as 
possible. 
On the other hand, it is easy to see that when either more 
than dy + 1 messages transmitted from the base station 
are received and recorded by the intruders, or more than 
dx + 1 sensor nodes have been compromised, the 
intruders can recover the polynomial f (x, y) via 
Lagrange interpolation. In this case, the security of the 
system is totally broken and the system cannot be used 
anymore. This property requires that both dx and dy be 
very large for the scheme to be resilient to node 
compromise attacks. 
 
Fig 3: Topology Creation 
An alternative approach based on perturbation of the 
polynomial was also explored. The main idea is to add a 
small amount of random noise to the polynomial in the 
original scheme so that the adversaries will no longer be 
able to solve the coefficients using Lagrange 
interpolation. However, this technique is proved to be 
vulnerable to security attacks [6], since the random noise 
can be removed from the polynomial using error-
correcting techniques. 
While hop-by-hop validation can be achieved through a 
public-key encryption system, the public-key based 
schemes were generally considered as not preferred, 
mainly due to their high computational overhead. 
However, our research demonstrates that it is not always 
true, especially for elliptic curve public-key 
cryptosystems. 
In our scheme, each SAMA contains an AS of n 
randomly selected nodes that dynamically changes for 
each message. For n = 1, our scheme can provide at least 
the same security as the bivariate polynomial-based 
scheme. For n > 1, we can provide extra source privacy 
benefits. Even if one message is corrupted, other 
messages transmitted in the network can still be secure. 
Therefore, n can be much smaller than the parameters dx 
and dy . In fact, even a small n may provide adequate 
source privacy, while ensuring high system 
performance. 
In addition, in the bivariate polynomial-based scheme, 
there is only one base station that can send messages. 
All the other nodes can only act as intermediate nodes or 
receivers. This property makes the base station easy to 
attack, and severely narrows the applicability of this 
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scheme. In fact, the major traffic in WSNs is packet 
delivery from the sensor nodes to the sink node. In this 
case, our scheme enables every node to transmit the 
message to the sink node as a message initiator. 
The recent progress on elliptic curve cryptography 
(ECC) has demonstrated that the public-key based 
schemes have more advantages in terms of memory B. 
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
In this section, we implement the bivariate polynomial-
based scheme and our proposed scheme in a real world 
comparison. The comparison is based on comparable 
security levels. 
The implementation in [4] was carried out on Mica2 
plat-form, which is 8MHz, while our implementation is 
carried out on Telosb platform, which is 4MHz. We first 
provide simulation in Table I to compare and justify our 
parameter selections. From the table, we can see that our 
results is comparable with the original paper. This 
justifies that the performance comparisons between our 
scheme and the algorithm proposed in [4] using different 
parameters are consistent and reasonable. 
1) Simulation parameter setup: The bivariate 
polynomial-based scheme is a symmetric-key based 
implementation, while our scheme is based on ECC. 
This requires us to determine the comparable key sizes. 
If we choose the key size to be l for the symmetric-key 
cryptosystem, then the key size for our proposed ECC 
should be 2l according to [22], which is much shorter 
than the traditional public-key cryptosystem. This 
progress facilitates the implementation of the validation 
scheme using ECC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 4: Block Diagram 
In our simulation setting, we choose five security levels, 
which are indicated by the symmetric-key sizes l: 24bit, 
32bit, 40bit, 64bit, and 80bit, respectively. The 
comparable key sizes of our scheme are 48bit, 64bit, 
80bit, 128bit, and 160bit, respectively. 
We also need to determine dx and dy for the bivariate 
polynomial-based scheme, and the n for our scheme. In 
our simulation, we select dx equal to dy and choose three 
values for them: 80, 100, and 150. We assume that 
WSNs do not contain usage, message complexity, and 
security resilience, since public-key based approaches 
have a simple and clean key management. more than 216 
nodes in our simulation, which is reasonably large. For 
size n of the AS, we choose three values in the 
simulation: 10, 15 and 20. 
We will compare the computational overhead, 
communication overhead, delivery ratio, energy 
consumption, transmission delay, and memory 
consumption of our proposed scheme with the bivariate 
polynomial-based scheme. 
2) Computational overhead: For a public-key based 
validation scheme, computational overhead is one of the 
most important performance measurements. So we first 
performed simulation to measure the process time. The 
simulations were carried out in 16-bit, 4 MHz TelosB 
mote. 
Table II shows the process time of our scheme and the 
bivariate polynomial-based scheme for both validation 
generation and verification. In the simulations, we 
assume that the key length of our scheme is 2l. 
 
Fig 5: Log in Block 
From the table, we have the following findings: 
• For the bivariate polynomial-based scheme, the 
validation generation time is much longer than the 
verifying time; while for our proposed scheme, the 
verifying time is about half of the validation 
generation time, except when n = 1, the generation 
time is shorter than the verification time.  
• Comparing bivariate polynomial-based scheme with 
our proposed scheme for n = 1, we find that the 
generation time of our scheme is less than 5% of the 
bivariate polynomial-based scheme for all dx, dy , but 
the verifying time is slightly longer when dx, dy is less 
than 100. When dx, dy is longer than 150, the verifying 
times of the two schemes are comparable.  
• The memory consumption of our proposed scheme is 
slightly less than the bivariate polynomial-based 
scheme in all scenarios.  
• For our proposed scheme, to provide source privacy, 
the cost of generation time and verifying time increase 
linearly with n.  
3) Communication overhead and message 
transmission de-lay: The communication overhead is 
determined by the mes-sage length. For the bivariate 
polynomial-based scheme, each message is transmitted 
in the form of < m, MAFm(y) >, where MAFm(y) is 
defined as: MAFm(y) = f (h(m), y) = 
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dy
  Mj yj . MAFm(y) is represented by its dy +1 
coefficients 
j=0 
Mi, ∗ Zp, 0 ≤ i ≤ dy , where p ∗ (2l−1, 2l) is a large prime 
number. The total length of the message is l(dy + 1). 
For our scheme, the message format is: 
(m, S, r1, y1, · · · , rn, yn, s), where m, s, ri, yi are all 
numbers with length L = 2l. S is the ID list for all the 
nodes included in the AS. Assuming the network is 
composed of λ nodes in total, each ID will be of the 
length: _log2 λ_. When n nodes are included in the AS, 
the length of S is n_log2 λ_. Therefore, the total length of 
one message for our scheme is: 
4l(n + 1) + n_log2 λ_. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 6:Source anomolous message validation 
The large communication overhead of the polynomial-
based scheme will increase the energy consumption and 
message delay. The simulation results in Fig. 3(a) and 
Fig. 4 demonstrate that our proposed scheme has a much 
lower energy consumption and message transmission 
delay. These simulations were carried out in java. The 
security levels 1, 2, 3, 4 correspond to symmetric key 
sizes 24bit, 32bit, 40bit, 64bit, and elliptic curves key 
size 48bit, 64bit, 80bit, 128bit, respectively. We also 
conduct simulations to compare the delivery ratios using 
ns-2 on RedHat Linux system. The results show that our 
scheme is slightly better than the bivariate polynomial-
based scheme in delivery ratio. The results are given in 
Fig. 3(c). Our simulation on memory consumption 
derived in TelosB, see Table III, shows the overall 
memory consumption for bivariate polynomial-based 
scheme is at least 5 times larger than our proposed 
scheme. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we first proposed a novel and efficient 
source anonymous message validation scheme (SAMA) 
based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). While 
ensuring message sender privacy, SAMA can be applied 
to any message to provide message content authenticity. 
To provide hop-by-hop message validation without the 
weakness of the built-in threshold of the polynomial-
based scheme, we then pro-pose a hop-by-hop message 
validation scheme based on the SAMA. When applied to 
WSNs with fixed sink nodes, we also discussed possible 
techniques for compromised node identification. We 
compared our proposed scheme with the bivariate 
polynomial-based scheme through simulations using ns-
2 and TelosB. Both theoretical and simulation results 
show that, in comparable scenarios, our proposed 
scheme is more efficient than the bivariate polynomial-
based scheme in terms of computational overhead, 
energy consumption, delivery ratio, message delay, and 
memory consumption. 
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